IIGCC oil and gas evaluation tool fails to meet net-zero standards

The Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) has published a new version of its Net Zero Standard for Oil and Gas. This is aimed at assisting financial institutions to evaluate oil and gas companies’ climate plans. The standard recognizes the need to cut oil and gas production in line with the IEA’s (International Energy Agency) Net Zero Emissions scenario. Like the Climate Action 100+ benchmark upon which it is based, it suffers from some key conceptual problems, including the lack of prioritization between key outcome-based metrics such as reducing oil and gas production, and procedural metrics such as disclosures. In terms of its content, it fails to require an end to the development of new oil and gas projects, it is vague on acceptable emission pathways, and it is extremely weak on offsets. 

Sector standards to complement the Climate Action 100+

IIGCC has more than 400 members from across Europe, mostly pension funds and asset managers, which together represent over €65 trillion in assets under management (1). It is one of the coordinators of the Climate Action 100+ investor initiative, as well as of two of the GFANZ sector alliances, the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative (NZAM) and the Paris Aligned Investment Initiative (PAII). 

IIGCC is developing a series of sector-specific net-zero standards designed to complement the sector-neutral “Company Benchmark” of the Climate Action 100+ (CA100+) by providing evaluation tools tailored to individual sectors. The net-zero standards are also intended to provide sector-specific checklists for investors using the Net Zero Investment Framework (NZIF) to assess the alignment of corporate transition plans with 1.5°C (considered in the standard to be interchangeable with “net zero”) (2). 

The oil and gas standard is the first of these sectoral net zero standards to be published (3). It incorporates lessons from a pilot version and is to be “used for initial public assessments of leading oil and gas companies in late 2023” (4). The standard provides guidance to investors on how to rank oil and gas companies against 90 binary (yes/no) metrics (5). 

All metrics are not equal

A key flaw in the design of the standard, which mirrors a key shortcoming of the CA100+, is that it fails to rank metrics, or groups of metrics, in terms of their importance. This means that oil and gas companies could score zero on the six metrics on IEA-aligned decreases in oil and gas production, but still get a high score overall because of doing well on the other 84 metrics. Similarly the standard does not instruct investors to give higher priority to emission reduction targets than to disclosure and corporate governance indicators. It also focuses more on target-setting rather than actual progress at meeting targets. 

This approach of all metrics being equal regardless of their importance on actually aligning emissions with 1.5°C needs to be replaced with an approach whereby some metrics are highlighted as indispensable: if they are not met then the company is not aligned with net zero. An indispensable metric for oil and gas companies must be an end to the development of new oil and gas supply projects: unfortunately ending expansion of oil and gas goes unmentioned in the standard. 

Unclear pathways

While the purpose of the standard is to help investors judge whether oil and gas companies are aligned with 1.5°C, it does not clearly insist that companies should follow a 1.5°C pathway. Two metrics score companies on whether their medium- and long-term targets are aligned with a “relevant net zero pathway,” meaning that the penalty for targets that are not aligned with 1.5°C would only be to drop 2 out of 90 possible points.  

Furthermore, no clarification is offered on which of the many available net zero pathways it considers to be “relevant”. This approach allows oil and gas companies to choose their own pathways, which even if still ultimately 1.5°C aligned, could involve a significant and dangerous overshoot of this temperature target, and be based on assumptions of unrealistic and unsustainable amounts of negative emissions (6). 

The metrics which score companies on their oil and gas production targets are based on the original 2021 version of the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions scenario (NZE). These should be updated to reflect the revised NZE in the IEA’s October 2022 World Energy Outlook. The updated NZE shows a much faster decline in gas production than in the earlier version: -21% between 2021 and 2030, and -72% 2021-2050 (the comparable 2019-2030 numbers given by IIGCC are -7% and -57%) (7).  

Allowing “reductions” to be met with junk offsets

The standard takes an unacceptably weak approach to offsets. Its approach is hugely weaker than the positions of the UN High-Level Expert Group on net zero (HLEG), as well as the Science-Based Targets initiative (SBTi), the Race to Zero, and even GFANZ. These last three are entities that IIGCC is either a member of or with which it works closely (8). 

Companies can meet up to half of their supposed emission reductions target with the use of offsets without losing any points. A company that met over 50% of its supposed reductions with offsets would lose only 2 points. Companies will receive positive scores for disclosing information on the quantity, type, and certification status of their offsets, but there are no metrics that require any specific offset quality requirements to be met. Yet it is well-documented that a large proportion of offsets are fraudulent, and many have been associated with land grabbing and other human rights issues (9).  

IIGCC must push ambition within GFANZ, not weaken it

Beyond the fundamental problems noted above, the oil and gas standard also fails to comply with the recommendations of the Race to Zero, HLEG and GFANZ by not insisting that decarbonization targets be based on both absolute and intensity emission metrics (10). The standard has only vague language on including end-use emissions in decarbonization targets: it states that a companies’ ambition should cover “the most relevant” Scope 3 emissions, but does not define what is meant by “most relevant.” 

IIGCC’s mission is to drive “significant and real progress” towards net zero. As a key group within the GFANZ ecosystem, including for its role as a convening organization for NZAM and PAII, its role should be to drive up ambition within GFANZ. Like its US peer organization, CERES, IIGCC is failing in this role.  

IIGCC needs to rewrite this standard with a set of minimum requirements for corporate net-zero transition plans, a focus on emission reductions over disclosures, and clarity that a minimum litmus test for an oil and gas company in transition is that it is aligned with the latest version of the NZE, which includes an end to developing new projects to increase hydrocarbon production.  

Notes:

  1. IIGCC describes itself as “the European membership body for investor collaboration on climate change and the voice of investors taking action for a prosperous, low carbon future” and states that its mission is “to support and enable the investment community in driving significant and real progress by 2030 towards a net zero and resilient future. This will be achieved through capital allocation decisions, stewardship and successful engagement with companies, policy makers and fellow investors” (https://www.iigcc.org/about-us/ 
  2. IIGCC, Net Zero Standard for Oil and Gas, p.3, 18 April 2023). IIGCC worked with the Paris Aligned Investment Initiative (PAII) to develop the NZIF. A large majority of the NZAM members which have set net-zero targets are committed to using the NZIF (NZAM, November 2022 initial target disclosure, 9 November 2022) 
  3. The development of the standard was led by IIGCC with support from the Transition Pathway Initiative, leading Climate Action 100+ investors, and regional investor groups. The process was chaired by the Church of England Pensions Board.  
  4. The pilot version was tested (confidentially) against the climate commitments of five European oil majors (IIGCC, Net Zero Standard for Oil and Gas, p.3, 18 April 2023).  
  5. The 90 metrics are divided into four “buckets”: disclosure; alignment assessments; divergence of company-wide emission targets with sector pathway; and climate solutions. Companies are given a percentage score for their performance for each bucket. Investors can then decide their engagement strategies with the companies based on these scores. 
  6. IISD, Lighting the Path: What IPCC energy pathways tell us about Paris-aligned policies and investments, June 2022 
  7. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2022, p.369, October 2022. The revised version of the NZE in the 2022 WEO shows similar levels of oil production in 2030 and 2050 as in the 2021 NZE (IEA, World Energy Outlook 2022, p.369, October 2022). Because of a much lower baseline for oil production in 2021 compared with 2019 (90 vs 98 mb/d), the percentage reduction by 2030 is significantly lower in the updated NZE (19% vs 27%). For gas the increased reduction in output is due to lower numbers in 2030 and 2050, rather than a significantly reduced baseline. Note that the IIGCC metrics for NZE oil and gas reductions vary slightly from Reclaim Finance calculations of these numbers based on excel file data for fig_03_03 downloaded from https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/net-zero-by-2050-scenario. 
  8. All these bodies recommend against the use of offsets to meet interim (pre-2050 or other net-zero year) emission reduction targets, and state that offsets should be used only for compensating for residual emissions which are impossible to abate, and should be based on permanent removals from the atmosphere (Race to Zero Expert Peer Review Group, Interpretation Guide, Version 2.0 June 2022, accessed 23 March 2023; HLEG, Integrity Matters: Net Zero Commitments by Businesses, Financial Institutions, Cities and Regions, p.19, November 2023; SBTi Criteria and Recommendations for Near-Term Targets: Version 5.1, p.10, April 2023; GFANZ, Expectations for Real-Economy Transition Plans, p.40, September 2022). 
  9. See e.g. International Rivers, Failed Mechanism: Hundreds of Hydros Expose Serious Flaws in the CDM, December 2007; B. Haya, Measuring Emissions Against an Alternative Future: Fundamental Flaws in the Structure of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, UC Berkeley School of Public Policy, December 2009; New York Times, A Carbon Trading System Draws Environmental Skeptics, 12 October 2010; Öko-Institut, How additional is the Clean Development Mechanism, March 2016; Financial Times, Carbon offset gold rush is distracting us from climate change, 22 November 2019; West et al., Overstated carbon emission reductions from voluntary REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon, PNAS, 29 September 2020; Bloomberg, How to Sell ‘Carbon Neutral’ Fossil Fuel that Doesn’t Exist, 10 August 2021; Carbon Direct, Assessing the State of the Voluntary Carbon Market in 2022, 6 May 2022; Guardian, Revealed: more than 90% of rainforest carbon offsets by biggest certifier are worthless, analysis shows, 18 January 2023 
  10. The Race to Zero’s expert group states, in most cases “absolute emission targets are necessary for ensuring real-world reductions.” (Race to Zero Expert Peer Review Group, Interpretation Guide, Version 2.0, June 2022, Section 7, accessed 23 March 2023). GFANZ notes that “getting absolute emissions to zero is the end goal, and both absolute and intensity metrics should be considered together to measure progress of different pathways to net zero” (GFANZ, Financial Institution Net-zero Transition Plans: Fundamentals, Recommendations and Guidance, p.79, November 2022) 

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2023-06-30T12:14:24+02:00