Europe’s energy trap: banking on fossil gas with Stade LNG

Europe seems to have overestimated its need for fossil gas. Yet many stakeholders continue to push for the development of new liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure across the continent. Take, for instance, the Stade LNG import terminal in Germany, one of the largest LNG terminals currently under development in Europe. According to our research, in mid-March the terminal secured EUR 1.4 billion in project financing from France’s BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale and nine other European and Asian banks (1). In the midst of Europe’s LNG boom, this terminal raises concerns about increasing dependence on fossil gas, threatening the European Union’s climate goals. It could also prove redundant to Europe’s energy needs at a time when gas consumption is at its lowest level in a decade (2). Banks need to step up their game: While some banks are restricting some financing for LNG, especially export terminals, much remains to be done to meet the energy needs in a credible scenario to limit global warming to 1.5°C.

Key findings

  • In March, Stade LNG, the liquefied natural gas import terminal in Stade, Germany, secured €1.4 billion in financing from a number of European and Asian banks, including BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale.
  • Given that Stade LNG is due to come on stream in 2027 and that LNG terminal capacity in Europe is expected to be three times greater than projected LNG demand by the end of the decade, the Stade LNG terminal will not meet the continent’s short-term needs for fossil gas but risks locking the region into unnecessary future dependence on gas.
  • Despite International Energy Agency (IEA) projections that demand for fossil gas will peak by 2030 and that no new LNG projects need to be developed if global warming is to be limited to 1.5°C, most banks continue to finance LNG projects and the companies developing them.

The onshore Stade LNG terminal is being developed by Hanseatic Energy Hub, a consortium of Buss Group, Dow, Enagas and private equity firm Partners Group (3). It will be used to regasify imported fossil gas, including shale gas from the United States (US) (4). The terminal was given the final green light at the end of March (5) after a project finance deal was secured to cover the estimated EUR 1 billion construction costs (6). The banks involved in this EUR 1.4 billion transaction are ABN AMRO, Banco Sabadell, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, ING, Korea Development Bank, Mizuho Bank, Société Générale, Standard Chartered, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and UniCredit (7) 

Stade LNG Terminal, adding fuel to the fire

With an expected commissioning date of 2027, Stade LNG terminal will not serve the continent’s short-term fossil gas needs. Europe has 37 operational import terminals, of which eight came online and four were expanded in 2022 and 2023 (8). Indeed, LNG expansion in Europe gained momentum in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the energy security concerns it raised. However, gas demand across the continent has steadily declined since then, and LNG consumption is expected to peak in 2025 (8). With new terminals still in the pipeline, Europe’s LNG terminal capacity could be three times higher than expected LNG demand by the end of the decade, according to estimates from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) (8).

Moreover, in the long term, the Stade LNG terminal risks locking the region into unnecessary fossil gas, jeopardizing the EU’s climate goals (9), on top of the climate and environmental impacts associated with fracking (10). LNG is a major source of greenhouse gases due to methane leakage, mainly from the complex transportation process (11). However, the developers of the Stade LNG terminal argue that the terminal will promote the “energy transition” because it will be able to process biomethane and synthetic natural gas from the time it is commissioned (12). Similarly, they argue that the terminal could later be converted to import ammonia as a means of transporting hydrogen (12). However, it is not very likely that the terminal will ultimately transport energy other than fossil gas in significant quantities. The case for large-scale production of biomethane and synthetic natural gas is bleak (13), and the climate benefits of these technologies are highly questionable (14). Similarly, the case for LNG terminals to use ammonia to transport hydrogen for energy purposes remains uncertain due to its low efficiency compared to the current use of ammonia for industrial purposes (15).

Banks’ support for Stade LNG symptom of wider problem

Some banks have adopted sectoral policies that restrict financing for new oil and gas fields, recognizing that International Energy Agency (IEA) projections show that it is possible to stop oil and gas expansion to meet the 1.5°C target without compromising global energy needs (16). However, they reject a similar conclusion by the IEA, which estimates that global LNG trade has limited room for growth as demand for fossil gas peaks by 2030 in all World Energy Outlook scenarios (17). Indeed, most banks can still finance most LNG projects, although some restrictions are emerging. Unfortunately, in almost all cases these restrictions apply only to some export terminals and are often vague enough to mean business as usual (18).   

When asked about specific projects, banks have indicated in recent months that they will not finance them directly: eight banks have said no to Papua LNG in Papua New Guinea, including Crédit Agricole, which was a financial advisor and also said it would not finance the Rovuma LNG project in Mozambique (19). Except that the French bank, like many others, still allows itself to finance LNG projects: export terminals, as long as they are not directly involved in a new field (20) and, even more so, import terminals. Ultimately, this shows a disconnect with the banks’ own climate commitments and understanding of what the energy needs are: new LNG projects are not needed to meet the world’s energy demand in a credible scenario aiming to limit global warming to 1.5°C. 

Banks must act against LNG development by adopting strict restrictions on project financing for export and import LNG terminals. Moreover, since project finance is only a small part of fossil fuel finance (21), to effectively prevent LNG expansion, banks must ultimately end their unconditional support for companies expanding LNG. 

Notes:

  1. Based on data extracted by Reclaim Finance from IJ Global database in March 2024. Reclaim Finance has contacted the banks in case they wish to make any clarifications. 
  2. Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis, European LNG Tracker, February 2024.  
  3. Hanseatic Energy Hub, Welcome to Stade.   
  4. Andy Gheorghiu Consulting, urgewald and Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V., How German banks and companies enable fracking LNG projects, April 2023. 
  5. Hanseatic Energy Hub, Green light given for Germany’s first land-based terminal for liquefied gases in Stade, 21 March 2024.  
  6. See Bloomberg, First German Land-Based LNG Terminal to Start Building, 21 March 2024.  
  7. Based on data extracted by Reclaim Finance from IJ Global database in March 2024. Reclaim Finance has contacted the banks in case they wish to make any clarifications. 
  8. Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis, European LNG Tracker, February 2024. 
  9. The EU’s target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 will require a reduction in fossil gas consumption of at least 33%, according to E3G’s analysis. 
  10. Objection against the permitting/construction of the LNG (liquefied natural gas) import terminal Stade (Hanseatic Energy Hub), June 2023. 
  11. See, for example, Shirizadeh, B., Villavicencio, M., Douguet, S. et al., The impact of methane leakage on the role of natural gas in the European energy transition. Nat Commun 14, 5756, 2023. 
  12. Hanseatic Energy Hub, LNG terminal project environmental policy, March 2024.  
  13. See, for example, Financial Times, Is synthetic natural gas any better than the real thing?, 3 April 2024; and, ICCT, Renewable gas is a distraction for Europe, November 2018. 
  14. See, for example, Agora Industry, Hydrogen import options for Germany, 31 October 2023; and, Bakkaloglu et al., Methane emissions along biomethane and biogas supply chains are underestimated, One Earth, 2022.  
  15. See, for example, NRDC, “Hydrogen-Ready” LNG Infrastructure: An Uncertain Way Forward, 14 February 2023; and, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, Conversion of LNG Terminals for Liquid Hydrogen or Ammonia, 3 November 2022.  
  16. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2022, October 2022.  
  17. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2023, page 139, October 2023.  
  18. For example, HSBC, ING, BNP Paribas, Société Générale Rabobank, and Westpac. They refer to new and/or expanded LNG export terminals linked to new oil and gas fields/reserves or that will favor the development of new fields in the future. See the Oil and Gas Policy Tracker 
  19. See Reuters, Credit Agricole says it will not fund two major LNG projects, 25 March 2024.  
  20. Reclaim Finance’s analysis of Crédit Agricole’s restrictions 
  21. 96% corporate finance versus 4% project-related finance to the fossil fuel industry over 2016-2022. According to 2023 Banking on Climate Chaos report. 

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2024-06-13T15:32:18+02:00