US LNG and european autonomy: the dilemma facing european banks

With Donald Trump using energy as a lever for geopolitical domination, Europe’s dependence (1) on US liquefied natural gas (LNG) is jeopardizing its strategic autonomy. This is happening with the support of European banks, which are backing the expansion of LNG in the United States. At a time of major geopolitical upheaval, banks must choose: support European strategic autonomy or contribute to its energy vassalization.

The United States now dominates the global LNG market (2), with more export terminal projects planned than any other country (3). Its main customer is the European Union (EU), which imported 57% of its LNG from the United States in 2025—a share that could reach 80% by 2030 (4). The gradual reduction of European dependence on Russian gas has thus come at the cost of the emergence of a new dependence, this time on US LNG. In addition to the climate consequences of such a choice (5), there is now a major geopolitical risk: that of Europe’s subordination to US interests (6). This risk has been acknowledged by European Commissioner for Energy Dan Jørgensen, who himself warned that the US president’s threats were a “wake-up call” for European energy security (7).

While Europe is making strategic autonomy and industrial competitiveness political priorities (8), some of its major banks are playing a key role in the expansion of LNG in the United States. A substantial portion of the financing provided by major European banks (9) to the LNG boom is allocated to US companies that are exclusively developing LNG export terminal projects on US soil. Leading the way are Venture Global, Cheniere Energy, and NextDecade, which are involved in ten new terminal projects in the United States, while Freeport LNG, a Special purpose vehicle (SPV), is dedicated to developing the export terminal of the same name in Texas (10).

Funding allocated by the main European banks to LNG expansion activities by leading developers between 2021 and 2024 (in millions of dollars) (11)

ING is one of the European banks most involved in LNG development across the Atlantic. Although the bank has committed to no longer providing project financing for new LNG export terminals from 2026 onwards (12), it can still provide financing to the companies developing them. And these are far from insignificant. On the contrary, the bank is the world’s leading financier of Venture Global (13), ), the world’s largest LNG developer, to which it has granted US$3.2 billion to support its LNG expansion activities between 2021 and 2024. Donald Trump’s arrival in power did not lead to a decline in its financing. In June 2025, the Dutch bank contributed US$579 million to a US$15.1 billion loan to Venture Global.

Crédit Agricole is also one of the largest financiers of US LNG. The French bank stands out in particular as the main global financial backer of Freeport LNG Investments, with US$1 billion granted in 2021 for its LNG expansion activities (14).

The support of European banks remains unwavering under the Trump administration. In January 2026, Crédit Agricole, ING, Santander—another major player in US LNG—, the Banque Populaire Caisse d’Epargne Group (BPCE) via its corporate investment bank Natixis, and Société Générale, alongside other banks, granted a US$1.1 billion refinancing loan to Freeport LNG Investments.

The pursuit of profits by some European banks, to the detriment of their commitments to European autonomy and sovereignty (15), threatens to derail Europe’s climate goals and expose European citizens to a lasting increase in their energy bills — while locking Europe into a politically risky energy dependence.

Energy is at the heart of Donald Trump’s strategy for US domination (16). The trade agreement concluded between the EU and Washington on July 27, 2025, is a striking illustration of this: negotiated under the threat of drastic increases in customs duties on European exports (17), it provides, in particular, for the EU to purchase US$750 billion worth of US energy by 2028 (18). In this context, European energy dependence constitutes a strategic vulnerability (19) that the United States can exploit to further its foreign policy objectives (20), to the detriment of the EU’s strategic autonomy (21).

Since 2022, the gradual replacement of Russian pipeline gas with imported LNG — particularly from the United States — has not reduced the vulnerability of European energy systems. It has prolonged it. Imported gas structurally exposes Europe to high prices and high volatility (22), linked to global markets, geopolitical tensions, and climate hazards (23). European consumers and industries bear the brunt of these price increases (24).

In terms of climate change, the implementation of the trade agreement signed with the United States, although unrealistic, would jeopardize the EU’s gas consumption reduction targets and slow down the transition to sustainable energy (25). In the longer term, beyond the risk of prolonged dependence on gas and lock-in to fossil fuels, the overcapacity of the LNG market, identified by consulting firms (26) and the industry itself (27), could turn certain European infrastructure into stranded assets (28). The costs of underused or decommissioned terminals could then weigh on local authorities and public budgets.

In this context, European banks need to change their strategy. Reclaim Finance urges them to strengthen their policies and end all financial services to LNG developers, particularly US developers, and their projects, so that profits do not take precedence over the interests of European countries and their populations.