Ending the financing of new LNG import terminals in Europe

The recent boom in liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports in Europe has triggered the proliferation of new LNG import terminal projects, whether through new facilities or the expansion of existing ones. The expansion of LNG, which is highly polluting and emissions-intensive, locks the continent into a fossil fuel-based energy system and carries significant risks of creating stranded assets.

This situation raises questions about the credibility of power utilities such as ENGIE, Enel, and RWE, which are driving new LNG projects. Financial institutions supporting these companies must demand an immediate stop to the development of new import terminals and to long-term import contracts which provide for import volumes incompatible with the drop in demand and European climate objectives.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, LNG demand has grown, (1) leading to the significant development of import infrastructure in Europe (2) to enhance the continent’s maritime supply capabilities. 16 new terminal projects are planned by 2030 (3) across more than 10 countries. (4) Major power utilities like France’s ENGIE, Germany’s RWE and Italy’s Enel are involved in LNG expansion via import terminal projects or long-term supply contracts. (5) In this race for expansion, ENGIE is focusing on the extension of two import terminals in France: (6) the Montoir-de-Bretagne terminal and the Fos Cavaou terminal. (7) The company’s gas strategy additionally relies on long-term LNG import contracts extending beyond 2040. (8)

Are new import terminals already obsolete?

In Europe, LNG import capacity increased by 22% between 2021 and 2023 and is expected to grow by 62% by 2028 compared to 2021. (9) At the same time, gas consumption has declined by 19% and is projected to fall by 29% between 2021 and 2028. (10) LNG demand in Europe likely peaked in 2022 at a level already well below Europe’s existing installed capacity, with forecasts showing a continuous decline until 2028. (11)

Graph 1: Evolution of gas and LNG capacities and needs in Europe – IEEFA, Europe LNG Tracker, 2024

Europe, already facing overcapacity in LNG imports, is also likely to see terminal utilization rates continue to drop this decade. For instance, these rates fell from 62% to 38% between June 2023 and June 2024 in the EU-27.(12)

Policymakers continue to justify the implementation of new import infrastructure by citing the need for energy security, particularly to reduce European dependence on Russian gas. However, an analysis of the evolution of needs and capacities shows that these developments are not the solution. On the contrary, Europe is developing substantial LNG import overcapacities. European solidarity has also been invoked as a justification, (13) whereas the reality is that several European countries are building their own (over)capacities. (14)

What are the consequences of continued LNG expansion?

Investments in LNG expansion lead to systemic bottlenecks. Declining gas consumption, energy-saving efforts, and the rise of sustainable energy pose a high risk of current installations and planned projects becoming stranded assets (15) before long. This situation would result in inevitable financial losses for the financial players supporting these projects. 

Another look ahead reveals that the development of LNG facilities that are likely to become obsolete but at the same time must be made profitable, combined with locking in imports through long-term contracts, deepens the European energy system’s dependence on fossil gas. This delays the transition to sustainable solutions and undermines the EU’s climate goals: fossil gas use is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, and LNG can be even more emissions-intensive than coal. (16)

Another significant concern lies in the origin of imported gas and its extraction method. In 2023, 46% of European LNG imports came from the United States, (17) where gas is primarily extracted via hydraulic fracturing. (18,19) This method has significant environmental impacts, including groundwater pollution from chemicals, air pollution from extraction sites, and greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, due mainly to methane leaks, (20) US LNG has 20% to 45% higher emissions compared to pipeline gas, (21) and 28% higher emissions than coal. 

Rather than focusing on the already available and necessary sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels, (22) Europe is risking creating LNG and fossil gas stranded assets and locking itself into an emissions-intensive, polluting energy system. 

The responsibility of financial institutions in LNG expansion

By supporting companies like ENGIE, Enel, and RWE, which are driving the development of new LNG import terminals in Europe, financial institutions play a significant role in LNG expansion. These power utilities rarely rely on project financing for terminal development or expansion. Instead, they primarily depend on the “corporate” financing directly granted to them. When financial institutions like Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, or Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations support ENGIE, they fully endorse LNG import terminal expansion.

Top 5 French banks (2021–2023)(23) Amount granted to ENGIE (2021–2023), (US $) Top 5 French investors (2023) Total investments in ENGIE (2023), (US $) (24)
Société Générale 546 million Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 1,551 million
Crédit Agricole 364 million CNP Assurances 420 million
BPCE Group 305 million BNP Paribas 608 million
BNP Paribas 248 million Crédit Agricole (incl. Amundi) 388 million
Crédit Mutuel 214 million Crédit Mutuel 157 million

Table 1: Main financial supporters of ENGIE

Therefore, ENGIE’s main investors, including Caisse des Dépôts and CNP Assurances, must now make financial support conditional on a public commitment by the company to halt current expansion projects for the Montoir-de-Bretagne and Fos Cavaou terminals and to stop signing new long-term LNG supply contracts which provide for import volumes incompatible with the drop in demand and our climate objectives. (25) A revision of ENGIE’s transition plan influenced by this demand, ahead of the “Say on Climate” vote scheduled for the 2025 Annual General Meeting, is an opportunity to ensure ENGIE’s credibility as it seeks to position itself as a major player in the energy transition.

Overall, financial institutions must demand that these companies commit to halting the development or expansion of LNG import terminals. This requires the major power utilities to implement transition plans aligned with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Financial institutions must also require an immediate public commitment to cease signing new long-term import contracts which provide for import volumes incompatible with the drop in demand and our climate objectives. 

Notes:

  1. Connaissance des énergies, Consommation de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) en Europe, 2022 
  2. Unless otherwise stated in this article, “Europe” refers to the 27 members of the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, Norway, and Turkey. 
  3. 35 import terminal projects have already been completed between 2022 and 2024. This figure includes onshore terminals and floating LNG terminals (or Floating Storage Regasification Unit – FSRU), and each phase or train is contemplated as a distinct project.
    This calculation has been made by Reclaim Finance using the 2023 Global Oil and Gas Exit List (GOGEL) extended database, including floating LNG terminals (or FSRU). See our methodology for more information. 
  4. Global Energy Monitor, Tracker Map – Global Energy Monitor, consulted on January 10, 2025 
  5. RWE, RWE hands over LNG infrastructure in Brunsbüttel to Deutsche Energy Terminal, December 2023
    Les Echos, L’allemand RWE et l’émirati ADNOC nouent un accord d’approvisionnement en GNL, September 2022
    Zonebourse, Enel prêt à reprendre son projet de GNL alors que l’Italie intensifie sa chasse au gaz, March 2022 
  6. GRT Gaz, Bilan prévisionnel pluriannuel et Plan décennal de développement 2022 – 2031, March 2023
    ENSTOG, TYNDP_2024_Infrastructure_Report.pdf, 2024
  7. These development projects follow the commissioning of a floating LNG terminal (or Floating Storage Regasification Unit – FSRU) in the Port of Le Havre in 2023. The energy company has also partnered in the development and management of a floating terminal in Wilhelmshaven.
    ENSTOG, TYNDP_2024_Infrastructure_Report.pdf, 2024
    Global Energy Monitor Wiki, Wilhelmshaven TES FSRU, consulted on January 3, 2025
    ENGIE, TES, E.ON and ENGIE partnership to manage the 5th Floating Storage Regasification Unit Import Terminal of Germany, September 2022 
  8. At the end of 2021, ENGIE extended its LNG shale gas import contract with Cheniere until 2041. In 2022, ENGIE signed an LNG import contract with the American company Next Decade, also running until 2041. In 2023, ENGIE signed an LNG import contract with the Australian company Tamboran for a duration of 10 to 15 years. 
  9. LNG import capacities increased from 257 Gm³ to 313 Gm³ between 2021 and 2023 in Europe and is expected to reach 416 Gm3 in 2028. IEEFA, Europe LNG Tracker, Existing and planned LNG infrastructure, updated September 2024 
  10. Total gas consumption is expected to decrease from 558 Gm³ to 397 Gm³ between 2021 and 2028 in Europe. IEEFA, Europe LNG Tracker, Gas consumption trends and LNG outlook, updated September 2024 
  11. LNG demand is expected to decline from 168.5 Gm³ to 111 Gm³ between 2022 and 2028 in Europe. IEEFA, Europe LNG Tracker, Gas consumption trends and LNG outlook, updated September 2024 
  12. IEEFA, Europe LNG Tracker, Gas consumption trends and LNG outlook, updated September 2024 
  13. For the development of the floating LNG terminal in Le Havre, the French government cited the need to “quickly secure the natural gas transit capacities to Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland.” 
  14. Les Amis de la Terre, Gaz fossile la fabrique de la dépendance, p.34, April 2024 
  15. Assets whose economic value has been impaired by external factors (such as changes in legislation, environmental constraints, or technologies…). 
  16. Robert W. Howarth, The Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Exported from the United States, May 2024 
  17. IEEFA, Europe LNG Tracker, Gas consumption trends and LNG outlook, updated September 2024 
  18. The hydraulic fracturing technique has been banned in France since 2011. 
  19. In 2022, 86.7% of US natural gas production came from shale gas, predominantly extracted through hydraulic fracturing. EIA, Natural gas explained, Where our natural gas comes from, updated December 2023 
  20. Methane is, on average, 80 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than CO2 over a 20-year period. Methane Global Warming Potential (GWP) over a 20-year period is published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). For more information, see: Reclaim Finance, Methane: an imminent threat for climate, October 2023 
  21. Connaissance des énergies, Importations européennes de GNL américain : une nouvelle dépendance, July 2023 
  22. International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2023, p.17, 30, 43, October 2023 
  23. This calculation has been made using the Banking on Climate Chaos 2024 database.
    Pour le soutien des banques françaises à ENGIE, voir également l’article de Reclaim Finance ENGIE: les banques soutiennent massivement l’expansion du gaz fossile, 2024. 
  24. Investing in climate chaos, Fossil Fuel Investment Data, updated in 2024 
  25. According to the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 (NZE) scenario, the power generation sector in Europe must be carbon-neutral by 2035, and CO2 emissions from the combined electricity and heat sectors must decrease by more than 90% by 2040. IEA, Net Zero by 2050, 2021. 

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2025-02-04T10:07:39+01:00