ENGIE’s LNG contracts: a long-term trap for the energy transition

The long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) import contracts that ENGIE increasingly relies on contribute to the development of new LNG export terminals, in contradiction with credible decarbonization scenarios (1). At the risk of seeing stranded assets multiply or locking the company into a trajectory of climate chaos, ENGIE’s investors must oppose this strategy by voting against the re-election of Catherine MacGregor as director and against the “Say on Climate” (SoC) at the company’s General Assembly.

The long-term LNG import contracts (2) are the cornerstone of LNG expansion: they secure planned export terminal projects and guarantee markets for growing production, leading to the exploitation of new fields. European buyers, such as ENGIE, play a major role in this regard, having signed numerous LNG import contracts since 2022 related to planned projects, notably in the United States (3). The signing of such contracts, which lock in substantial LNG volumes for decades, undermines the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C— a concern that ENGIE seems to dismiss.

ENGIE’s long-term contracts support LNG and gas expansion

Between 2021 and 2023, ENGIE signed at least three new contracts (4) in addition to the three currently in place, which were signed between 2012 and 2018 (5). These new contracts extend beyond 2040 and involve importing shale gas from the United States. They are linked to new LNG export terminals and are necessary to secure financing for these projects (6). However, these terminals should not be built: the International Energy Agency (IEA) has repeatedly stated in its Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario that new LNG export terminals are incompatible with a 1.5°C pathway (7).

By signing these contracts, ENGIE also promotes the exploitation of new fossil gas fields and associated infrastructure, thereby locking-in a highly carbon-intensive trajectory. The boom in LNG demand, to which ENGIE contributes through its contracts signed in the United States, is one of the major reasons for the rapid growth of gas exploitation in the Permian Basin (8). This growth is accompanied by the construction of new pipelines (9).  

The most recent contract signed by ENGIE involves purchasing fossil gas from Sempra for 15 years from Port Arthur LNG (10), a terminal under construction that is expected to begin operations in 2027. Kinder Morgan plans to develop the Trident Intrastate Pipeline to transport gas from the Permian Basin to the Port Arthur area, with commissioning scheduled for the same time as the first phase of the Port Arthur LNG terminal (11). 

ENGIE’s contracts are incompatible with European decarbonization objectives

The signing of these contracts contradicts ENGIE’s commitment to the energy transition. They involve gas extracted by hydraulic fracturing (12), associated with particularly high methane emissions—U.S. LNG is more emission-intensive than coal (13).

Proof of the discomfort caused by this discrepancy, ENGIE, under pressure from the French state, initially had to backtrack on signing a contract with NextDecade for importing LNG from the Rio Grande LNG project in Texas (14). The French government was concerned about the environmental impacts of such a contract. And rightly so: the terminal would generate 191 million tonnes of CO2e annually (15), equivalent to 49 coal-fired power plants (16). The contract, which involved importing 1.75 million tonnes per year of LNG, was eventually signed in 2022 (17), with ENGIE justifying this choice by relying on NextDecade’s carbon capture and storage (CCS) project, which was supposed to reduce over 90% of the terminal’s CO2 emissions. The CCS project was eventually abandoned by NextDecade (18), while the contract remains in effect.

The mismatch between the planned LNG import volumes and European decarbonization objectives also raises concerns about the development of stranded assets. The increase in LNG import capacities on the European continent, combined with a decline in gas and LNG consumption (19), could already lead to LNG import capacities in Europe being three times higher than demand by 2030 (20).

In this context, ENGIE could choose to re-export the LNG volumes planned under its U.S. contracts (21) to Asia (22)— thus shifting the risk of locking in a carbon-heavy climate trajectory to another region of the world, forgetting that the fight against climate change is a global issue.

ENGIE’s strategy of signing long-term LNG import contracts is incompatible with a carbon-neutral trajectory. ENGIE must commit to not signing new long-term LNG import contracts without evidence that they are not linked to the construction of new export terminals or the opening of new gas fields. Reclaim Finance calls on ENGIE shareholders to vote against the SoC and the renewal of Catherine MacGregor’s mandate as director, also CEO of the company, at the utility’s General Assembly.

Notes:

  1. As in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE) scenario from the International Energy Agency
  2. Our analysis considers contracts with a duration of 5 years or more.
  3. Since 2022, European buyers have signed contracts for the purchase of approximately 23 bcm/year of LNG linked to U.S. LNG terminals currently under construction, and 12 bcm/year linked to projects awaiting their final investment decision, such as Calcasieu Pass 2. See: Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia, Bridging the US-EU Trade Gap with US LNG Is More Complex than It Sounds, February 20, 2025 
  4. ENGIE has signed long-term contracts to purchase LNG from the Rio Grande LNG project (1.75 Mtpa, 15-year duration), Port Arthur LNG (0.88 Mtpa, 15 years), and Corpus Christi LNG (0.99 Mtpa, 20 years) in the United States.
  5. Out of at least eight long-term contracts signed by ENGIE since 1999 (two contracts expired in 2018 and 2023), with durations between 14 and 21 years. LNG long-term contract data from Sierra Club LNG Tracker and Enerdata (updated January 2024). 
  6. Energy Council, The Balancing Act: Long-Term Stability and Market Flexibility in LNG Contracting, September 27, 2024 
  7. See the World Energy Outlook 2022, World Energy Outlook 2023 and World Energy Outlook 2024 from the IEA 
  8. See MRT, Expanding US LNG exports must answer price sensitivity question, January 23, 2025
    U.S. Energy Information Administration, Permian production forecast growth driven by well productivity, pipeline capacity, August 21, 2024 
    U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural gas production in the Permian region established a new record in 2022, June 13, 2023 
  9. Rextag, Permian Basin Gas Production Pushes Limits – Infrastructure Expansion Needed, October 29, 2024
  10. Sempra, Sempra Infrastructure Announces Agreement with ENGIE for Supply of U.S. LNG from Port Arthur LNG Phase 1, December 6, 2022
  11. See Kinder Morgan, Trident Intrastate Project and Natural Gas Intelligence, Kinder Morgan Sanctions Trident Natural Gas Pipeline, Expands Mississippi Crossing Project, January 23, 2025 
  12. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
  13. See the analysis by Robert W. Howarth’s, The greenhouse gas footprint of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported from the United States, September 2024   
  14. Le Monde, Gaz de schiste : un projet texan controversé suscite l’intérêt d’énergéticiens français, April 3, 2023 
  15. Sierra Club, US LNG Export Tracker (Greenhouse gas emissions tab) 
  16. Given that a typical 1 GW coal-fired power plant emits 6.3 million tons of CO2e per year, according to Global Energy Monitor. 
  17. Next Decade, NextDecade and ENGIE Execute 1.75 MTPA LNG Sale and Purchase Agreement, May 2022  
  18. Reuters, NextDecade withdraws carbon capture project application at FERC, August 20, 2024 
  19. See IEEFA, Europe’s LNG imports decline 19% with gas demand at 11-year low, February 18, 2025 and European LNG Tracker, February 2025: “Europe’s LNG imports declined by 19% in 2024. The continent’s gas consumption fell by 20% between 2021 and 2024 thanks to renewables deployment and demand reduction policies.” 
  20. IEEFA, European LNG Tracker, Ferbuary 2025 
  21. The contracts signed with U.S. developers are of “Free On-Board (FOB)”, which gives them flexibility for the re-export of imported LNG. See Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia, Bridging the US-EU Trade Gap with US LNG Is More Complex than It Sounds, February 20, 2025 and Energy Flux, US LNG’s affordability crisis, March 24, 2025 
  22. ACER, Analysis of the European LNG market developments – 2024 Market Monitoring Report -Highlights, April 19, 2024 

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2025-04-02T10:28:18+02:00